The goal of incremental cryptography is to design crypto-
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Permission to copy without fee all or part of this material is granted prov"ded that the copies are not made or distributed for direct commercial advanta~e, the ACM copyri ht notice and lhe title of the publication and Its date appear,an i notice is fjiven that copyin is by permission of A virus may attack the remet e host, and inspect, and alter the cent ents of the remote medium (but it does not have access to the processor's protected local memory).
To protect his files against such viruses, the processor computes for each ilJe an authentication tag, depending on a key which is kept in the (safe) local memory. A virus tampering with the file can't re-compute the tag, and verification of the tag will thus detect tampering. Now note that for this to work, the processor must re-authenticate 'his tiles when he modifies them. Clearly, it is desirable to be able to update the authentication tag rather than always having to re-compute it from scratch. This problem is especially complex when the local memory is not large enough to hold (even temporarily) a single file or when it is too expensive to bring in the entire file. We note that files in this virus setting can grow very large and be subject to frequent updates; eg. consider a database being periodically altered.
The idea of incremental cryptography, as we outlined in [BGG] , is to take advantage of such settings, and find ways to compute the cryptographic transformation on a document D not from scratch, but rather, somehow, as a fast function of the values of the cryptographic transformittion on the documents from which D was constructed. We'll assume for simplicity that s and 121 are recoverable from each of the keys K', K" output by the generator on input (1", IE I). The above definition does not address security, which is more primitive-specific, In response to a create document command, with pa4For example, the move-subtext operation is easily expressed in terms of (upto six) cut and paste operations.
To move t symbols from start-location i + 1 to start-location j + 1 > i + I in the text
. . 2'[1], we cut the text at locations i, i + I and j, producing the subtexts
. . TV] and T"" = T~+1] . . .T [~] . Next, we paste together T', T'", T" and T'". The output of lncT satisfies One example is to use only DES, assumed to be a PRF. I?or a 56 bit DES key a let the PRF $., taking b-bit inputs, be defined by cipher block chainingthis is still a PRF [BKR] . Now note that the number of DES computations to compute the tag in our scheme is essentially just 5% more than that for doing DES CBC of the entire message. Thus we run at essentially the same speed as the most widely used existing message authentication scheme with the added advantage of increment alit y.
As an aside we note that the XOR schemes of [BGRJ require at least 25~0 more DES operations than the CBC. THE BINARY TREE SCHEME. To help the reader understand what follows the binary tree scheme is now presented. The construction may be standard, but the proof that it achieves tamper resist ante is not trivial; however we'll omit it because we present and prove correct a more general scheme below.
Assume for convenience that Z = 2h is a power of two. 'I'he The increment aJ tagging algorithm works as follows.
Suppose Tag(.) is the function describing the tag of D, and that the j'k symbol of D is to be replaced by the symbol a G X. We first check that the path from the claimed current value to the root of the tree is valid. . . . D[/1] is a 2-3 tree of MA-tags, hereafter referred to as a tag-tree. Each node w is associated a label which consists of a tag (authenticating the children) and a counter representing the number of leaves in the subtree rooted at w. The tag of w is formed by authenticating (using MA.) the labels the children of w, in the natural generalization of the above. Namely, the label of an internal vertex w is a pair (MAa(LI, L2, Ls), size), where L; is the label of the 9 To insert a leaf, add it as a child to the suitable level h -1 vertex. In case the resultin~children-de~ree of this vertex is 4, sulit it into two vertices so that~oth are child;en of its parent. The p'ar&rt may be split so too, and so on until one gets to the root. If the root needs to be split then the height of the tree is incremented.
To delete a leaf, we aPPIY an analogous procedure. Namely, if the resulting parent and its siblings have total children-degree at least 4 then we ;earrange these children so that each of the resulting Darent nodes has children. demee ".-~-.
either 2 or 3. In case the total children-degree is at most 3, we merge the parent and its sibling to one vertex and turn to its parent.
ith child of w (in case w has only two children, Ls =~) and size is the number of leaves in the subtree rooted at w. The tag of the root is formed as the other tags, except that the information to which MA. is applied contains also the document name and the version-counter. Verification is done analogously to the way it was conducted in the binary-tree scheme (i.e., for each vertex we check that VMAa accepts its tag as valid authentication of the labels of its children) except that we also check that the subtree-counters of the children sum-up to the subtree-counter of their parent.
The incremental tagging algorithm proceeds as follows.
Suppose that a document, so tagged, is to be cut at location j. We first locate the jth leaf (using the subtree counters contained in the nodes A sketch of the proof of the following theorem is in Appendix A. We assuming for simplicity that s = log,~Zl. For each file, the user only needs to keep 0(s) bits (in local secure memory); these bits are used to store the key of the authentication-scheme, the file-name and its current version-counter. Whenever the file is modified the tag-tree (residing in the insecure media) and the versioncounter (kept in the secure local memory), are modified as described in the incremental scheme (above). Whenever the user wishes to verify the integrity of its file, it verifies the validity of the tag-tree in the obvious manner. We now consider two events defined over the probability space of all possible executions of the above attack.
The first event is that the adversary has produced (either as part of a tampering command or as part of its output) a tree-tag cent aining an MAa-t ag for a string for which an MAa-t ag did not appear as part of some tag-tree created by the system (in response to some 'create' or 'modify' command). The second event is that the same MAa-tag appears as the tag of two different strings in either two different tag-trees or in the same tag-tree, produced by the system (in response to some 'create' or 'modify' command). Both events may occur only with negligible probability, since each of them constitutes a breach of the security of the basic message authentication scheme MA. If none of the events occur, we call the execution good.
From this point on, we assume that the execution is good and show that (in this case) the tag-tree output by the adversary is for a document, denoted D, which has appeared before as a virtual document.
Since the tag-tree output by the adversary is valid, it follows that all the MA-tags appearing in it are valid. By the assumption that the execution is good, it follows that all these tags, and in particular the tag of the root, have appeared in some previous tag-tree (produced by the system). some vertex in the actual tag-tree of a (resp.,~) to its root is valid then the labels of the children of the vertices on this path equal the corresponding labels in the virtual tree of a (resp., P). Once this claim is proven we are done (since then we are guaranteed that the newly formed MA=-tags are tags for the correct values).
The claim is proven by induction from the root of this path, using the hypothesis that the execution is good, the fact that the virtual tag-tree of a consists of MAa-tags produced by the system, and the hypothesis that the virtual tag-tree of a is a valid tag-tree (for the corresponding virtual document).
Firstly, if the tag of the root of the actual tag-tree for document a having current version-counter cnt is valid then it must have been produced by the system for document a at the time its counter was increment ed to the value cnt. Thusl the root of the actual tag-tree equals the root of the virtual tag-tree of a. It follows that the labels of the children of root of the actual tag-tree are as in the corresponding virtual tagtree. In particular, the subtree counters of the corresponding children in the two tag-trees are equal and thus the locations of the corresponding subtexts are the same. Similarly, if the tag of a vertex, v, of the actual tag-tree is both valid and equals the corresponding tag in the virtual tag-tree then the labels of v's children are as in the corresponding virtual tagtree, 'The claim follows and so does the lemma. s
We now claim that the virtual tag-tree of V, equals the tag-tree produced by the adversay (for D). First, we observe that the actual tag-tree of Vt at time t contains as its root an MAa-tag of a string containing the document name Q and a counter-version denoted cnt. However, by validity of the virtual tag-tree of Vt it follows that also the virtual tag-tree contains as its root an authentication of the document name a and the counter-version cnt. Combining this with the definition of the incremental algorithm and the fact that each MA-tag in the virtual tag-tree has appeared in an actual tagtree, we infer that the roots of both the actual and virtual tag-trees of Vt are identical. Thus, the virtual tag-tree of V, and the output tag-tree of D have identical roots (recall that by definition the root of the actual tag-tree of w equals the root of the tag-tree of D). By the assumption that the execution is good and the fact that the virtual tag-tree consists of M A~-t ags produced by the system, we conclude again that these two (valid) tag-trees (ie., the virtual tag-tree of Vt and the tag-tree of D) must be identical, and again V* = D follows. This concludes the proof that in every good execution the authenticated document output by the adversary (ie., D) is a virtual document which has appeared before.
